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With the demise of apartheid, South Africa has become a nation in 
fl ux and transition, preoccupied with remaking and redefi ning itself. 
Undoubtedly, within the postapartheid context, literature has a role 
to play in redefi ning the South African polity. For Derek Attridge 
and Rosemary Jolly, the emphasis in the remaking of the “new South 
Africa” should fall on the acknowledgement of difference without fe-
tishizing it (5–13). Like other postapartheid narratives such as Breyten 
Breytenbach’s Dog Heart (1999) and André Brink’s The Rights of Desire 
(2001), J. M. Coetzee’s Disgrace (1999) is acutely conscious of its situa-
tion within the postapartheid context and engaged with redefi ning the 
South African nation. In this essay, I argue that what is distinctive about 
Coetzee’s novel is that, within a postapartheid context of uncertain fl ux 
and upheaval, it interrogates the identity of the South African nation at 
its foundations. I will show that the novel posits a foundational discourse 
that alludes to how the true foundation of South Africa lies in a concep-
tion of the nation as the homeland of black South Africans. Conversely, 
the novel critiques the foundational discourse of white South Africans as 
a duplicitous rhetoric by means of which whites lay false claim to South 
Africa as homeland. Foundational discourses that underpin the South 
African nation are subject to interrogation, contestation, and even to 
being rewritten in non-foundational terms. 
In examining the foundations of the South African nation, Disgrace 
is, further, strongly inclined to conceive of the nation as a homeland. 
South Africa, in other words, is thought of not merely in the imper-
sonal terms of a nation, but as a homeland toward which one feels a vital 
sense of belonging and emotional attachment. One is not just citizen of 
a nation but rather the nation is one’s homeland and heartland. To con-
ceive of the nation as a homeland is, to adopt Kenneth Parker’s expres-
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sion, to approach the nation as “the space where the affections center” 
(67). Specifi cally, Disgrace’s inclination to conceive of South Africa as a 
homeland is enacted in terms of an emotional relation to the land of 
South Africa (which one may playfully suggest is the literal foundation of 
the nation). One aspect of Coetzee’s interrogation of the foundations of 
South Africa will be the attempt to imagine, for the white South African, 
a conception of the South African nation that is not predicated on land. 
Disgrace and National Epic
 ‘Shameful!’—
brimming with indignation, Pallas Athena broke out.
‘Oh how much you need Odysseus, gone so long—
how he’d lay hands on all these brazen suitors!’ 
(Odyssey 1.294–6; original emphasis)
The themes of nation and homeland in Disgrace are broached through 
the novel’s inconspicuous use of the epic genre as intertext, specifi cally 
its subtle invocation of the Odyssey. At the most basic level, Disgrace con-
tains a narrative parallel with the Odyssey by means of which it fi gures 
the homecoming of black South Africans and their reclamation of South 
Africa as their homeland. Unlike precursors like Ulysses, the Homeric 
parallel in Disgrace is small-scale and inconspicuous, escaping critical 
attention thus far. As I will demonstrate, Petrus along with Lucy’s assail-
ants represent homecoming Odyssean fi gures, Lurie parallels the defi ant 
suitors, while Lucy is the Penelope who fi nally “marries” homecoming 
Petrus. Accordingly, Petrus, Lurie and Lucy are characterized along the 
lines of their respective Homeric epithets: Petrus is resourceful and cun-
ning, especially with words,1 Lurie is brazen (“Mad, bad, and danger-
ous to know” [77], as Lucy puts it.), while Lucy is circumspect. Lurie’s 
impudence, which echoes the suitors, is also suggested by his attitude 
at the inquiry: “He is going into this in the wrong spirit. But he does 
not care” (47). To be sure, Disgrace’s intertextual relationship with the 
Odyssey is more complex than I can examine in the limited space here. 
Some aspects I do not explore are the novel’s dual Odyssean parallels, its 
extensive bricolage of the Odyssey and Odyssean texts like Ulysses and, 
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further, the import of subjecting this foundational text of Western lit-
erature to bricolage, particularly in a postapartheid context. The reader, 
however, need not probe too deeply to detect Disgrace’s allusions to the 
Odyssey: its twenty-four chapters,2 its ironic references to Lurie’s nostos 
upon his return to Cape Town,3 Lurie’s frequent statements that a god 
acted through him (52, 89, 192),4 even moments when Lurie imagines 
a supernatural sign (126, 191). One could playfully suggest that while 
there are no gods in Coetzee’s end-of-the-millennium novel, there are 
dogs, beings who arguably effect, not from above but from below, a 
small though fundamental change in Lurie. Disgrace further contains a 
playful nod to the epic convention of a journey to the underworld in 
Lurie’s fi rst visit to the animal shelter, where he encounters snarling dogs 
at the entrance and an “inner room” of death for unwanted animals (80). 
Aptly, a drug used to put the animals down evokes for Lurie an image 
of Hades: “Lethal: the name of a drug? He would not put it beyond the 
drug companies. Sudden darkness, from the waters of Lethe” (83). 
In this essay, I will confi ne my discussion of Disgrace’s Homeric inter-
text to the narrative parallel suggested above. The Odyssey intertext in 
Disgrace is perhaps most dramatically present in the attack scene at the 
point where the dogs are shot:
Now the tall man appears from around the front, carrying 
the rifl e. With practised ease he brings a cartridge up into 
the breech, thrusts the muzzle into the dogs’ cage. The big-
gest of the German Shepherds, slavering with rage, snaps at 
it. There is a heavy report; blood and brains splatter the cage. 
For a moment the barking ceases. The man fi res twice more. 
One dog, shot through the chest, dies at once; another, with 
a gaping throat-wound, sits down heavily, fl attens its ears, fol-
lowing with its gaze the movements of this being who does not 
even bother to administer a coup de grâce.
 A hush falls. The remaining three dogs, with nowhere to 
hide, retreat to the back of the pen, milling about, whining 
softly. Taking his time between shots, the man picks them off. 
(95–6)5
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This episode is a telescoped transposition of Odysseus’ spectacular 
homecoming and his massacre of the suitors in Book 22. Let me quote 
the opening of Book 22 though I would like to stress that the entire 
Book 22 (“Slaughter in the Hall”) right up to the absence of grace in the 
cruel execution of the unfaithful maids,6 is implied as a subtext to the 
episode:
Now stripping back his rags Odysseus master of craft and battle
vaulted onto the great threshold, gripping his bow and quiver
bristling arrows, and poured his fl ashing shafts before him,
loose at his feet, and thundered out to all the suitors:
‘Look—your crucial test is fi nished, now, at last!
But another target’s left that no one’s hit before—
we’ll see if I can hit it—Apollo give me glory!’
 With that he trained a stabbing arrow on Antinous … 
just lifting a gorgeous golden loving-cup in his hands,
just tilting the two-handled goblet back to his lips,
about to drain the wine—and slaughter the last thing
on the suitor’s mind: who could dream that one foe
in that crowd of feasters, however great his power,
would bring down death on himself, and black doom? 
But Odysseus aimed and shot Antinous square in the throat
and the point went stabbing clean through the soft neck and out—
and off to the side he pitched, the cup dropped from his grasp
as the shaft sank home, and the man’s life-blood came spurting
out his nostrils—
       thick red jets—
              a sudden thrust of his foot—
he kicked away the table—
           food showered across the fl oor,
the bread and meats soaked in a swirl of bloody fi lth.
The suitors burst into uproar all throughout the house
when they saw their leader down. They leapt from their seats,
milling about, desperate, scanning the stone walls—
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not a shield in sight, no rugged spear to seize.
They wheeled on Odysseus, lashing out in fury:
‘Stranger, shooting at men will cost your life!’
‘Your game is over—you, you’ve shot your last!’
‘You’ll never escape your own headlong death!’
‘You killed the best in Ithaca—our fi ne prince!’
‘Vultures will eat your corpse!’
            Groping, frantic—
each one persuading himself the guest had killed
the man by chance. Poor fools blind to the fact
that all their necks were in the noose, their dooms sealed.
With a dark look, the wily fi ghter Odysseus shouted back,
‘You dogs! you never imagined I’d return from Troy—
so cocksure that you bled my house to death,
ravishing my servant-women—wooed my wife
behind my back while I was still alive!
No fear of the gods who rule the skies up there,
no fear that men’s revenge might arrive someday—
now all your necks are in the noose–your doom is sealed!’
(1–42; my emphasis)
The suitors are aptly called “dogs” and one cannot but be impressed 
by the vivid, luxuriant, even indulgent representation of violence in 
Homer’s text. One also observes Coetzee’s neat transposition of Homer’s 
opening lines:
Now stripping back his rags Odysseus master of craft and battle
vaulted onto the great threshold, gripping his bow and quiver ….
Now the tall man appears from around the front, carrying the rifl e.
Beneath the attack on Lucy’s smallholding lies a larger subtext, what 
we can view as a larger untold epic nationalist narrative. At the most 
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basic level, the Odyssey subtext serves as an interpretative reading of the 
end of apartheid and, more broadly, the end of minority white domi-
nance in South Africa. It fi gures the triumphant homecoming of black 
South Africans after long years of displacement, their righteous reclama-
tion of their homeland and their punishment and expulsion of illegiti-
mate, badly-behaving white occupants from their homeland. Following 
the allusion to epic, the unnamed “tall man” is physically impressive: 
not only is he tall, he is “handsome, strikingly handsome, with a high 
forehead, sculpted cheekbones, wide, fl aring nostrils” (92).7 Petrus is 
linked to the tall man through verbal association. In our fi rst encounter 
with Petrus, on the day Lurie arrives at Lucy’s smallholding, he is also 
described as a “tall man.” In addition, Petrus’ fi rst appearance echoes 
the Homeric motif of Odysseus as the man at the threshold: “A man is 
standing in the doorway, a tall man in blue overalls and rubber boots and 
a woolen cap. ‘Petrus, come in, meet my father,’ says Lucy” (63–4; my 
emphasis). Within the narrative parallel, Petrus as a version of Odysseus 
at the threshold does go on to (re)possess the land and in the process 
“marry” a Penelope-fi gure in Lucy. 
By invoking epic narrative, Disgrace posits a discourse of the South 
African nation that functions as an alternative to South Africa’s prevailing 
national discourses, which one encounters in its new Constitution and 
its controversial Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC). Both the 
Constitution and the TRC, in their interrelated ways, postulate domi-
nant national discourses based on truth-telling, reconciliation and the 
forsaking of revenge. South Africa’s political transition from apartheid 
to democracy was achieved not by a bloody revolution but by multi-
party negotiations that led to the drawing up of an Interim Constitution 
in 1993, whose fi nal version was ratifi ed in 1996 after the country’s fi rst-
ever democratic elections in 1994. The Interim Constitution, which in-
augurated a democratic state of human rights, also contained a post-
script, aptly titled “National Unity and Reconciliation,” which outlined 
a program of national reconciliation through the tools of forgiveness and 
amnesty. In envisioning the country’s future, the postscript states: “The 
pursuit of national unity, the well-being of all South African citizens and 
peace require reconciliation between the people of South Africa and the 
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reconstruction of society.” It then sets forth its vision and program of 
national reconciliation, fi rstly, through its much quoted moral suasion 
that offences of the past be met not with retaliation but forgiveness and, 
secondly, through amnesty provisions to past offenders:
The adoption of this Constitution lays the secure foundation 
for the people of South Africa to transcend the divisions and 
strife of the past, which generated gross violations of human 
rights, the transgression of humanitarian principles in violent 
confl icts and a legacy of hatred, fear, guilt and revenge.
 These can now be addressed on the basis that there is a need 
for understanding but not for vengeance, a need for reparation 
but not for retaliation, a need for ubuntu and not for victim-
ization.
 In order to advance such reconciliation and reconstruction, 
amnesty shall be granted in respect of acts, omissions and of-
fences associated with political objectives and committed in 
the course of the confl icts of the past.8 
Following the 1994 elections, this postscript was subsequently passed 
by Parliament as the “Promotion of National Unity and Reconciliation 
Act” (1995) which became the basis of the TRC’s mandate. 
The TRC enlarged upon and propagated more widely the Constitution’s 
discourse of national reconciliation and forgiveness. Under the TRC, led 
by Bishop Desmond Tutu, the Constitution’s program modulated into 
a Christian-infl ected discourse of confession, forgiveness, healing and 
reconciliation. As a high-profi le event that was widely covered by the 
national and international media, the TRC in effect became an infl u-
ential instrument in the remaking of the nation, its widely propagated 
discourse a narrativization of a new national identity. Albie Sachs’ terse 
comment—“The Commission of Truth and Reconciliation. It is the cre-
ation of a nation” (qtd. in Wilson 13)—though exaggerated neverthe-
less underscores the importance accorded to the TRC in the remaking 
of the nation. In the fi nal Report of the TRC, Bishop Tutu, quoting the 
Constitution, also claims a foundational place for the TRC: “Like our 
Constitution, the Commission has helped in laying ‘the secure foun-
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dation for the people of South Africa to transcend the divisions of the 
past’” (23). 
In his extensive study of the TRC, Richard Wilson examines how the 
work of truth commissions, including the TRC, are inevitably bound 
up with the project of narrativizing the nation. “Truth commissions, 
like all nation-building processes construct a revised national history 
and … write into being a ‘new collective memory.’ … [T]he formula-
tion of a shared national past is simultaneously the basis of the assertion 
of a shared national future” (14). In the South African example, Wilson 
observes that “the ‘new South Africa’ national personhood became tied 
up in how to respond to past human rights abuses. Being authentical-
ly South African comes to mean sharing the trauma of apartheid and 
uniting in the subsequent process of ‘healing the nation’” (14). Wilson 
further observes that the TRC frequently resorted to a narrative of the 
nation as a sick body in need of healing through Christian notions of 
confession, forgiveness and reconciliation:
Firstly, the nation is conceived as a physical body …. What 
type of body is it? A sick one—one that is in need of heal-
ing. Healing the nation is the popular idiom for building the 
nation. What is the healing treatment prescribed? Truth-telling 
and, fl owing from this, forgiveness and reconciliation. How 
do these treatments heal the national body? They open the 
wounds, cleanse them and stop them from festering. (14–5)
While the TRC’s discourse of forgiveness and healing was widely 
propagated, it did not mean that participants at TRC hearings necessar-
ily heeded its rhetoric. As Wilson observes: 
For the fi rst six months of the Human Rights Violations hear-
ings around the country, Commissioners specifi cally pressed 
those testifying to forgive the perpetrators then and there. After 
hearing each testimony, they asked as a matter of course, ‘Do 
you forgive the offender?’ This question was seen as fairly out-
rageous by numerous observers … and just as many victims, 
and was occasionally met with such a hostile response that it 
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eventually had to be abandoned. However, at subsequent, HRV 
hearings, victims were more subtly pressed by Commissioners 
to testify, to forgive and to reconcile. Throughout the entire 
amnesty process, victims were asked as a matter of routine 
whether they opposed the application and whether they for-
gave the applicant. (119) 
Evidently, the Odyssey subtext in Disgrace contests the discourse of for-
giveness and reconciliation advanced by the Constitution and the TRC. 
This situation can be thought in terms of the opposition between two 
national discourses or even in terms of a national discourse being con-
tested by a more fundamental homeland discourse, the latter evoked by 
the novel’s epic intertext. While the Constitution urges “understanding 
but not … vengeance,” the Odyssey subtext starkly delineates a narrative 
of homeland reclamation accompanied by a revenge ethic notable for its 
intensity, indulgence and will to settle all scores. Coetzee signals his will 
to contest prevalent national discourses advocating forgiveness and rec-
onciliation by using an intertext that does not mince its stance of deep 
hatred, anger and vengefulness. Following Robert Nozick’s formulation, 
the Odyssey advocates revenge which sets no limits on the punishment 
as opposed to retribution which “sets an upper limit on punishment ac-
cording to the seriousness of the wrong (what lawyers call ‘proportional-
ity’)” (qtd. in Wilson 161). The revenge ethic has a prominent place in 
Homer. Not only is Odysseus’ revenge given divine sanction, the reader 
is further invited to savor his revenge both in its—through the narrative 
refrain that the denouement will not be reached “till the suitors [have] 
paid the price for all their outrage” (13.220)9—and its magnifi cent ac-
tualization in Book 22. In contrast with Coetzee’s spare rendition of 
carnage (“There is a report; blood and brains splatter the cage.”), Book 
22 invites one to read with relish its voluptuous depictions of the suit-
ors’ violent deaths, from the overture of Odysseus’ arrow slicing through 
Antinous’ neck to the subsequent slaughter of the suitors en masse, ren-
dered through epic simile: 
The attackers struck like eagles, crook-clawed, hook-beaked,
swooping down from a mountain ridge to harry smaller birds
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that skim across the fl atland, cringing under the clouds
but the eagles plunge in fury, rip their lives out—hopeless,
never a chance of fl ight or rescue—and people love the sport—
so the attackers routed suitors headlong down the hall,
wheeling into the slaughter, slashing left and right
and grisly screams broke from skulls cracked open—
the whole fl oor awash with blood. (316–24)10
Though the representation of carnage in Disgrace is spare, the implica-
tion is that Homer’s entire chapter of hatred, revenge and violence—in 
all its massiveness and turbulence—is invisibly compressed within it. 
(For this reason, I have quoted at length from the Odyssey to give a sense 
of the pressure of an extensive intertext within Coetzee’s spare prose.)
The Odyssey intertext clearly serves as an oppositional discourse to the 
TRC’s discourse though its specifi c critique of the TRC is more elliptical 
and open-ended. In the most ostensible terms, the Homeric narrative 
questions the effectiveness of the TRC in carrying out national reconcil-
iation. Though the TRC’s discourse of forgiveness and healing may have 
been widely propagated, the presence of a revenge subtext suggests that 
its engagement may have been superfi cial. As a subtext, the Homeric 
text literally posits a deeper and hidden reality that the TRC has not 
come to grips with. This view is corroborated by Wilson’s conclusion 
that on balance the TRC had little effect in transforming popular con-
ceptions of justice as retributive into its ideal of restorative justice.11 In 
this reading, the revenge subtext is a sign of a deeper condition the TRC 
has not successfully fathomed. The reconciliation it programmatically 
advocates is too “easy” and does not address deeper, more fundamental 
issues in the South African condition. In this sense, the persistence of 
an unsettling revenge subtext also functions to resist the scenario, ob-
served by Rob Nixon, of how the TRC’s “state-orchestrated forgiveness 
may open the doors to forgetfulness” (“Aftermaths” 76). In her discus-
sion of the TRC, Ingrid de Kok highlights the frequent criticism of the 
TRC that it may “unwittingly encourage cultural and social amnesia.” 
De Kok refers to “the TRC’s imperative to have the story—often called 
by commissioners ‘this chapter of our history’—closed” (59). Disgrace’s 
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revenge subtext serves to resist any easy closure—or forgetfulness—of 
the past that the TRC may effect. 
At the risk of going against current critical sympathies for antifoun-
dationalist thinking, I argue that the role of the novel’s Homeric subtext 
is to point not only toward a deeper condition but toward foundational 
issues that relate to the South African nation. As I have mentioned, 
Disgrace is a text engaged in the interrogation of the South Africa nation 
at its foundations. (The novel’s conception of the South African nation 
in terms of a “homeland” is one indication of how it probes the im-
personal concept of nation for its deeper emotional core.) In the most 
general terms, the subtextual status of the Homeric narrative alludes to 
a level of anger and violence that has not fully manifested itself to the 
country, one perhaps still in a state of repression. It is an anger and vio-
lence that the nation, not least the TRC, has not become conscious of 
nor reckoned with.12 Further, the Homeric revenge narrative is of such a 
scale and intensity as to suggest that the payment exacted by black South 
Africans is not only for wrongs committed during the apartheid era, but 
for the accumulated crimes going back to the fi rst white offences against 
the indigenous people in the colonial era. In this regard, the Odyssean 
subtext represents not just a deeper reckoning of white offences but a 
reckoning of transgressions at the foundational level, one that takes into 
account white crimes on the soil of South Africa in their amassed his-
torical totality. The suitors who shamelessly bleed and exploit Odysseus’ 
kingdom are Coetzee’s apt proxies for whites and their outrageous be-
havior in South Africa. One notes, for example, how Eumaeus’ com-
plaint to the disguised Odysseus resonates with the white exploitation 
of South Africa: “All too long we’ve sweated/over these white-tusked 
boars—our wretched labor—/while others wolf our work down free of 
charge!” (14.470–2). Hyperbole in Homer effectively conveys the ex-
tensive scale of white offences in the country; “their [the suitors’] pride 
and violence hit the iron skies” (15.6), we are told at one point. 
In invoking the Odyssey as intertext, Coetzee posits not only an al-
ternate national discourse, but also an alternate foundational discourse 
which, in addition to suggesting an alternative conception of national 
foundations, also contests the new national Constitution in its role as 
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foundational discourse of the new South Africa. We know that though 
the Constitution “lays the secure foundation for people of South Africa,” 
it is also the product of a political compromise that is by no means fi nal. 
The nation’s cornerstone is, in other words, not set in stone but open 
to critique and rewriting, a process in which Disgrace partakes. Epic 
is, among other things, a narrative of national foundations. As M. M. 
Bakhtin observes: 
[The] constitutive feature [of epic] is the transferral of the 
world it describes to an absolute past of national beginnings 
and peak times. The absolute past is a specifi cally evaluating 
(hierarchical) category. In the epic world view, “beginning,” 
“fi rst,” “founder,’ “ancestor,” “that which occurred earlier” and 
so forth are not merely temporal categories but valorized tem-
poral categories …. (15; original emphasis) 
While Bakhtin’s main point is epic’s relegation of national history to a 
sealed off, valorized temporal sphere, he does in passing conceive epic’s 
role as a narrative that inscribes national foundations. 
In invoking a foundational discourse, Disgrace seeks to defi ne the 
South African nation in fundamental terms that hark back to origins 
and beginnings. The intertextual narrative of Odysseus’ homecoming 
and homeland reclamation therefore implies a reading of recent events 
in South Africa not merely as a victory over the apartheid state but a 
victory that has resonance for the original precolonial African home-
lands. Coetzee is not suggesting that victory over apartheid actually re-
covers the ancient homelands, but intimates that a truer formulation 
of national foundations in South Africa lies in a conception of precolo-
nial African kingdoms and chiefdoms in which are implied the original 
homelands of black South Africans and their ownership of the land of South 
Africa. The Odyssean leitmotif of homeland reclamation therefore im-
plies a corrective to a history of land dispossession not confi ned to events 
in the apartheid era, but conceived in a more fundamental sense. Land 
dispossession is not conceived say in a limited sense as caused by twen-
tieth-century legislation like the Group Areas Act and the Native Land 
Act in the apartheid and segregation eras respectively. Rather the epic 
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leitmotif implies a conception of land dispossession in a sense accumu-
lated through the long centuries of land confl icts, traced to its origins in 
the fi rst territorial confl icts in the 1650s. The lengthy exilic years now 
implied by the term “odyssey” aptly underscores this cumulative histori-
cal sense. Equally appropriate is the setting of the novel’s action on the 
Eastern Cape which is territory that has been historical witness to the 
fi rst land wars. As Grant Farred observes: 
The Eastern Cape border, since those long ago, infamous wars 
among the white colonists, the Afrikaner Trekkers and the in-
digenous black people, marks if not the original point of con-
fl ict then certainly the most enduring site of antagonism be-
tween black and white. From at least the eighteenth century 
the Eastern Cape has played host to struggles against colonial 
incursion, struggles over livestock, over boundaries, over con-
trol of the land. (17)
The novel’s Eastern Cape setting is in line with its interrogation of the 
South African nation to its possible foundations.
In Disgrace’s alternative formulation of foundations, the novel stresses 
that South Africa is not merely nation but homeland to black South 
Africans. The notion of homeland reinforces the deep sense of belong-
ing and attachment black South Africans have in relation to the land 
of South Africa, while it also foregrounds the dimension of land in a 
deliberately literal conception of foundations. This playfully literal un-
derstanding of national foundations is not misplaced and is a vital com-
ponent of any attempt to fathom more deeply the true foundations of 
South Africa. Alluding to the land wars that mark South African history, 
Disgrace suggests that the dimension of land is literally one of the prob-
lematic foundations of the nation, particularly in the form of unresolved 
land confl ict. 
By positing an alternative foundational discourse, Disgrace questions 
the adequacy of the Constitution as the recently installed “foundation” 
of the country. As mentioned, the Constitution is largely a compromise 
or deal resulting from political negotiations. Within the terms of this 
deal, democratic rights for the latter-day nation were secured, enshrin-
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ing a “future founded on the recognition of human rights, democracy 
and peaceful coexistence and development for all,” while issues of the 
past were, depending on how one sees it, either dealt with through the 
TRC or seemingly written off. In many ways, the compromise seemed 
to write off outstanding issues of the past: amnesty was granted for 
human rights offenders; victims were required to relinquish their legal 
right to seek redress or reparation; little material reparation has been 
made to apartheid victims and to black South Africans at large. Overall, 
the pace of material redistribution has been slow so that commentators 
have cautioned against the fallacy of a “new South Africa” (see Nixon, 
“’An Everybody’” 24). While the new dispensation of rights is laudable, 
one wonders how shaky the new Constitutional foundation is, espe-
cially one that seems not to have adequately addressed many outstand-
ing inequities of the past. Disgrace refl ects awareness of the superfi ciality 
and instability of this compromise. It gestures toward the deeper foun-
dations of black South Africans’ claim to South Africa as homeland and 
their prior ownership of the land, issues that have not been adequate-
ly addressed. It also shows the compromise of the Constitution being 
subject to revision, as we shall see, in Lucy’s negotiation and deal with 
Petrus. In representing Lucy’s transaction with Petrus in language that 
mirrors the Constitution (“an alliance, a deal” [203]), the novel suggests 
that the political deal of the Constitution is far from fi nal but continues 
to be remade, with a larger price for the compromise borne by the white 
South African. 
White Homeland Discourse and the Critique of South African Pastoral 
If the homeland discourse for black South Africans remains subtextually 
occluded in Disgrace, the homeland discourse for white South Africans 
by contrast gets an airing in the novel. White national discourse is vis-
ible in Disgrace in the form of pastoral discourse, in particular white 
South African pastoral. The latter is a prominent discourse through 
which Afrikaners construct their relation to South Africa as their nation, 
indeed more than nation, as homeland. In White Writing: On the Culture 
of Letters in South Africa, Coetzee examines how the ideology of South 
African pastoral enables the Afrikaner to lay proprietorial claim to the 
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land of South Africa. Pastoral discourse in fact constructs a myth of 
the Afrikaner’s natural and transcendent right to the land. Land fi gures 
prominently in this Afrikaner national discourse. As we shall see, the 
Afrikaner conception of South Africa as homeland is inextricably bound 
up with a relation to the land of South Africa, the latter often coded in 
the terms of transcendence and territorial depth, e.g. the pastoral tropes 
of being at one with or rooted in the land. In Disgrace, when fragments 
of pastoral rhetoric surface within the web of Lurie’s consciousness, they 
are not just incidental elements but synecdoches of a larger homeland 
discourse. The rivalry of opposing homeland discourses in Coetzee’s 
postapartheid text is played out in terms of distinctive genres. If the epic 
mode codes black South Africans’ claim to South Africa as homeland, 
then the pastoral mode codes that of the Afrikaners. 
In Disgrace, Lurie constantly thinks of Lucy (as well as Petrus) in 
terms of pastoral. Upon arriving at Lucy’s smallholding, Lurie imag-
ines his daughter in terms of South African pastoral: “Now here she is, 
fl owered dress, bare feet and all, in a house full of the smell of baking, 
no longer a child playing at farming but a solid countrywoman, a boerv-
rou” (60). After Lucy’s rape, Lurie imagines that Lucy persists in staying 
on on her farm because of her love for the land which is a leitmotif of 
South African pastoral: “She is here because she loves the land and the 
old, ländliche way of life” (113). In the novel’s fi nal vision of Lucy in the 
last chapter (217–8), Lucy is perceived by Lurie in terms of an elaborate 
pastoral representation. Here pastoral takes on a Romantic register as 
the narrative alludes to Wordsworth’s “Lucy poems.” 
Though Disgrace features a white homeland discourse, its goal never-
theless is to critique and negate this discourse. In the following discus-
sion, I will demonstrate that one important impulse in the novel is its 
ironization and negation of pastoral discourse and how, by this gesture, 
the novel seeks to undermine a foundational Afrikaner discourse. Critics 
have analyzed the role of pastoral in Disgrace though, in my view, they 
fail to detect the novel’s crucial ironic stance towards pastoral (for ex-
ample, see essays by Rita Barnard).13
Coetzee’s most extensive writing on the genre of South African pasto-
ral occurs in White Writing. In this critical volume, Coetzee analyzes the 
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ideology of South African pastoral through the English-speaking farm 
novels of Olive Schreiner and Pauline Smith, but especially through an 
analysis of the Afrikaans plaasroman of the 1920s–40s period, in particu-
lar the farm novels of C. M. van den Heever. Coetzee’s lengthy analysis of 
pastoral in White Writing, particularly the sections on Van den Heever’s 
farm novels, is important as it allows us to view in detail how pastoral 
functions as a homeland discourse for the Afrikaner and, more impor-
tantly, the terms by which this discourse lays (the Afrikaner’s) claim to 
South Africa as home. The discussion in White Writing further suggests 
that, besides being a homeland discourse, pastoral is also a foundational 
discourse for the Afrikaner in terms of how it encodes the transcendent 
basis of the Afrikaner’s relation with South Africa as well as how it in-
scribes his origins in South Africa. Pastoral joins the Constitution and 
the epic intertext as the assortment of foundational discourses evoked in 
Disgrace in its interrogation of national foundations. 
In White Writing, Coetzee discusses the role pastoral discourse plays 
in constructing for the Afrikaner a relation to South Africa as home-
land which, in more specifi c terms, is a relation to South Africa with 
the following interrelated features: a natural proprietorial right to the 
land of South Africa that is fi gured not in terms of individual but “tran-
sindividual familial/tribal” (4) ownership of the land implying a geneal-
ogy going back to the founding fathers; a transcendent or organic bond 
with the land of South Africa; and an attachment to the earth that is 
couched in ethical dimensions of piety, good stewardship and love for 
the land. One immediately observes that, as articulated by pastoral, the 
Afrikaner’s homeland relation to South Africa is defi ned primarily in 
terms of his relation to the land of South Africa. This fi xation on the 
land is underscored by Van den Heever’s statement, quoted by Coetzee, 
that the basis of Afrikaner culture and nationhood lies in the Afrikaner’s 
“bondedness” with the land:
In an essay entitled “The Form of the Afrikaner’s Civilization 
and Culture” [Van den Heever] writes that “the slumbering 
might of the culture of every people” has its basis in “the bond-
edness of man to the earth.” Man is “mystically united … by 
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a dark love” to the earth, which is the “soil of generation” of 
national culture. (87) 
In White Writing, Coetzee underscores the mind-bogglingly dense 
and elaborate rhetoric that pastoral develops around the Afrikaner’s re-
lationship with the land. Though not explicitly stated in White Writing, 
Coetzee’s unspoken charge is how the Afrikaner lays claim to the land 
of South Africa by means of this elaborate rhetoric. The Afrikaner’s pas-
toral rhetoric of mystical fusion or loving “bondedness” with the land, 
viewed ironically, dramatizes literally (!) how he has the land of South 
Africa in his tenacious clutch. The Afrikaner, in other words, lays claim 
to the land of South Africa by, as rhetorically fi gured, a crude unyield-
ing clutching of the land! As we shall see, Disgrace ironizes the codes of 
pastoral to expose the illegitimacy of its implied transcendent claim to 
the land.
Let me at this point give a sense of pastoral’s elaborate rhetoric of 
the land which Coetzee analyzes in White Writing. An important point 
Coetzee makes is how Van den Heever’s farm novels construct for the 
Afrikaner a “myth of natural right” to the land by foregrounding the 
labor of the founding fathers:
In the myth of natural right elaborated by Van den Heever, the 
founding fathers pay for the farm in blood, sweat, and tears, 
not in money: they hack it out of primeval bush, they defend 
it against the barbarians, they leave their bones behind in its 
soil. (85)
Given that white occupants claim their “natural right” to the land 
through their labor what results is the “occlusion of black labor” (5) in 
South African pastoral: 
If the work of hands on a particular patch of earth, digging, 
ploughing, planting, building, is what inscribes it as the prop-
erty of its occupiers by right, then the hands of black serfs doing 
the work had better not be seen. Blindness to the colour black 
is built into South African pastoral. (5; original emphasis)
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As Coetzee points out, the detection of South African pastoral’s si-
lence about black labor would expose its claim of natural right to the 
land as a myth. Further, the claim of natural right to the land is not 
the claim of an individual but of an entire genealogy. The farm in fact 
becomes the locus of an extended genealogy in which the trace of the 
founding fathers can be discerned. Van den Heever’s farms embody:
… an organic mode of consciousness belonging to a people 
who, from toiling generation after generation on the family 
farm, have divested themselves of individuality and become 
embodiments of an enduring bloodline stretching back into a 
mythicized past. (6)
Pastoral discourse posits the land as being claimed not just by an indi-
vidual but by an entire genealogy that stretches back to the “mythicized” 
origin of the founding fathers. Pastoral is in this sense a foundational 
discourse for the Afrikaner as it inscribes for him, however mythically, 
his origin in South Africa, coded in terms of a relation with the land. 
The dense rhetorical web that pastoral develops around the Afrikaner’s 
relation to the land may also take on high-sounding ethical or transcen-
dent dimensions. Because the farm is seen as the embodiment of an an-
cestral genealogy, to sell or abandon the farm is to violate the trust of the 
ancestors. “Inherited ownership of the farm therefore becomes a sacred 
trust: to alienate the farm means to forsake the bones of the ancestors” 
(85). For characters of Van den Heever’s novel Somer, the potential sale 
of their ancestral farm Driefontein is discussed in terms of one’s ethical 
obligations towards one’s bloodline: “Driefontein that has been in the 
family since the Great Trek!” “Great-grandfather, Grandfather, Father 
and all the others would be shamed if we let the ground go” (qtd. in 
White Writing 84). Ownership of the farm in fact involves multiple eth-
ical codes—there is the code of being a good steward to the land, the 
code of tending the land that fulfi ls one’s duties towards the ancestors 
and further the code of loving the land in a relation akin to marriage: 
Besides farming the land in a spirit of piety toward voorgeslag-
te and nageslate (past and future generations), besides being a 
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good steward, the farmer must also love the farm, love this 
patch of earth above all others, so that his proprietorship comes 
to embody a marriage not so much between himself and the 
farm as between as between his lineage and the farm. Such a 
marriage, which must be exclusive (monogamous) and more 
than merely proprietorial, will entail that in good years the farm 
will respond to his love by bringing forth bountifully, while in 
bad years he will have to stand by it, nursing it through its 
trials. The fi nal test that the bond between them is supramate-
rial will be passed when a mystic communion of interpenetra-
tion takes place between them, when farmer becomes vergroeid 
(intergrown, fused) with farm: “Never before had he felt such 
a bond with the earth. It was now as if the life within it were 
streaming up into his body … as if he and the earth were living 
in a silent understanding (Groei [Growth]).” (86)
This long passage illustrates the elaborate rhetorical web pasto-
ral weaves between the Afrikaner and his land. The upshot is that the 
Afrikaner does not “own” the land in a mere material sense. Such owner-
ship, as well as questions of ownership, are superseded by the complex, 
supramaterial bond that emerges between him and the land, one medi-
ated by elaborate ethical and transcendent codes. By the time the bond 
reaches its apotheosis, when “a mystic communion of interpenetration 
takes place between [the Afrikaner and his land],” there is no longer any 
question who has laid claim to the land (the question of claim having in 
fact been rendered irrelevant).
As one might expect, pastoral discourse in Disgrace echoes the rhetoric 
found in White Writing though, as I argue, it is subject to radical ironi-
zation. In addition, though Lurie himself already takes an ironic stance 
towards pastoral, this posture does not preempt the text’s further ironiza-
tion of Lurie’s use of pastoral. In the novel, Lurie thinks of Lucy’s rela-
tion to the land following the above codes of South African pastoral. He 
imagines her sturdy embeddedness in the land (62) as well as her love 
of the land (113). Following pastoral ideology, he also imagines persons 
as having an organic relationship with the land; he thinks of Ettinger as 
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“a man of the earth, tenacious, eingewurzelt [rooted in]” (117) and of 
Lucy’s unborn child as a “child of this earth” (216). (Signifi cantly, the 
latter characterization is met with Lucy’s resisting silence.) My larger ar-
gument, however, is that Lurie’s pastoral representations of Lucy are not 
only ironized but wholly negated because they constitute entirely unreli-
able representations of Lucy. Though Lurie may construct Lucy’s rela-
tion to South Africa in pastoral terms, Lucy herself does not conceive her 
relation to the country in these terms. In reading Disgrace, it is crucial 
to distinguish between Lurie’s (mis)representations of Lucy’s relation to 
South Africa and, to the extent that we can ascertain, Lucy’s actual rela-
tion to South Africa, as Lucy herself conceives it. If pastoral as a home-
land discourse is inapplicable to and vacuous for Lucy, then in Lucy one 
fi nds articulated an alternative mode of conceiving South Africa as home. 
Similarly, while pastoral is not Lucy’s foundational discourse, one fi nds 
articulated in Lucy a foundational discourse in an alternative register.
To begin, Lucy, at a fundamental level, does not even view her small-
holding as a farm: “Stop calling it the farm, Lurie. This is not a farm, it’s 
just a piece of land where I grow things–we both know that” (200; origi-
nal emphasis). In Lucy’s epistemology, the land is stripped of pastoral’s 
rhetorical and ideological coding; her statement in fact refl ects a mind 
devoid of pastoral rhetoric and ideology. Given pastoral’s dense rhe-
torical web, its erasure within Lucy’s consciousness is signifi cant—one 
could suggest that Lucy’s mind is decolonized of white pastoral ideology, 
a contrast with how pastoral epistemology persists in framing Lurie’s 
consciousness. Careful reading, for instance, shows that Lucy does not 
conceive the topography of South Africa in terms of pastoral’s binary 
division of country/city, a rhetorical structure that dominates Lurie’s 
consciousness. As Lucy stresses, her site is “just a piece of land,” imply-
ing that it is undistinguished from other pieces of land in the nation. A 
site in Cape Town would for Lucy be no different from her site in the 
Eastern Cape, both being equally “just [pieces] of land.” While Lurie 
constantly thinks of escaping the country to the city (“If she had any 
sense she would quit: … consign the farm to Petrus, return to civiliza-
tion” [151]), Lucy shows a lack of thinking in terms of safe and unsafe 
sites, specifi cally in terms of the binary between a safe city and an unsafe 
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country. In her statement of intent after the rape, Lucy says: “It was 
never safe, and it’s not an idea, good or bad. I’m not going back for the 
sake of an idea. I’m just going back” (105). When Lucy remarks that 
“[i]t was never safe,” she is referring to her condition of living in the new 
South Africa—one without safety—which she has clear-sightedly coun-
tenanced and embraced. Her term of reference is not a South Africa that 
can be falsely divided to create zones of escape, but South Africa itself 
which “was never safe.” Her fi nal sentence that she is “just going back” is 
thus a statement of her intention to continue to stay on in South Africa 
itself, on an unsafe site no different from other unsafe sites in the unsafe 
nation, as opposed to an intention to stay on on “the farm” with all the 
pastoral connotations Lurie evokes. 
Let me add that Lucy’s statement that she is not going back “for the 
sake of an idea” further rejects any suggestion that her actions are moti-
vated by a pre-existing ideology like pastoral. This statement is consis-
tent with the principle Lucy establishes earlier as important for her—
that she “[doesn’t] act in terms of abstractions” (112). Among the impli-
cations of this principle is the insight that Lucy’s acts are not determined 
by abstract ideologies like pastoral. When Lurie later thinks that Lucy 
stays on on the farm “because she loves the land and the old, ländliche 
way of life,” he misreads her. Lucy continually accuses her father of 
misreading her (112; 161) and Lurie’s persistence in approaching Lucy 
through a pastoral epistemology constitutes a misreading of her that re-
sults in vacuous representations of her.
To detect more acutely the novel’s ironization of Lurie’s pastoral 
discourse, one needs to be aware of Coetzee’s extensive use of unreli-
able narration, particularly as it applies to Lurie’s interior monologue. 
Attentive reading will reveal that extensive sections of Lurie’s interior 
monologue are in fact unreliable, if not wholly baseless and vacuous. For 
example, Lurie presumes that what motivates Lucy’s silence on her rape 
is its shame and frequently weaves elaborate narratives of shame over her 
silence, like the one below: 
[Lucy] would rather hide her face, and he knows why. Because 
of the disgrace. Because of the shame. That is what their visi-
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tors have achieved; that is what they have done to this confi -
dent, modern young woman. Like a stain the story is spreading 
across the district. Not her story to spread but theirs: they are 
its owners. How they put her in her place, how they showed 
her what a woman was for. (115; see also 108–10, 132)
At no point, however, does Lucy share Lurie’s assumption that shame 
underlies her silence. When she gives her reason for her silence, it has 
nothing to do with Lurie’s notions of shame (112). Lurie’s elaborate 
monologue on Lucy’s shame proves wholly vacuous—it tells us more 
about his presumptuous attempt to speak on Lucy’s behalf (and thereby 
impose his ethics on her) than it reliably represents Lucy’s motivations. 
Indeed, Lurie’s internal monologue is so extensively unreliable that the 
novel’s representations of key characters like Lucy and Petrus, which are 
focalized through this monologue, are often signifi cantly, if not wholly, 
unreliable. Critics have thus far not detected Coetzee’s use of extensive 
unreliable narration in Disgrace though he has employed this mode in 
earlier texts like Age of Iron and The Master of Petersburg.14 
Awareness of the novel’s use of radical unreliability enables us to see 
how it not only ironizes pastoral but subjects it to total negation. The 
latter is achieved by Coetzee’s sly strategy of constructing pastoral rep-
resentations that, in the context of the narrative, amount to nothing in 
terms of being reliable representations. Take, for example, Lurie’s lyrical 
closing view of Lucy that stretches for two pages:
He reaches the fence and stops. Lucy, with her back to him, has 
not yet noticed him. She is wearing a pale summer dress, boots, 
and a wide straw hat.… 
 Lucy straightens up, stretches, bends down again. Field-
labour; peasant tasks, immemorial. His daughter is becoming 
a peasant.… 
 So: once she was only a little tadpole in her mother’s body, 
and now here she is, solid in her existence, more solid than he 
has ever been. With luck she will last a long time, long beyond 
him. When he is dead she will, with luck, still be doing her 
ordinary tasks among the fl owerbeds. And from within her 
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will have issued another existence, that with luck will be just as 
solid, just as long-lasting. (217; my emphasis)
A wary reader would detect the novel’s subtle irony in the pastoral 
idealization that leads Lurie to simplify Lucy’s persistence on the small-
holding. In Lurie’s assessment, it is through luck that Lucy will per-
sist. His pastoral epistemology also idealizes Lucy’s actions as simple and 
eternal. Lurie’s pastoral idealization occludes the signifi cant price Lucy 
calculates she must pay to stay on (158) and the careful deliberation 
behind her actions. It is certainly not through luck that Lucy persists 
and her actions are far from ordinary, uncomplicated tasks. As a reliable 
representation of Lucy’s motivations, this passage is wholly vacuous. Far 
from being legitimized as a homeland discourse, Lurie’s pastoral dis-
course in the novel is ironized as having zero validity in defi ning a rela-
tion to South Africa. Lucy will indeed persist in her relation to South 
Africa though, as I argue in the next section, in terms of her own ethical 
code and not pastoral transcendence. 
The novel is further critical of how pastoral defi nes homeland rela-
tions in terms of territorial depth. Within pastoral’s economy, land is 
fi gured as an entity one may lay hold of in a deep way. In one of Lurie’s 
fi rst pastoral representations of Lucy, criticism is gently directed at how 
Lucy is fi gured as having a relation of depth with the land: 
She talks easily about these matters. A frontier farmer of the 
new breed. In the old days, cattle and maize. Today, dogs and 
daffodils.… 
 They walk back along an irrigation furrow. Lucy’s bare toes 
grip the red earth, leaving clear prints. A solid woman, em-
bedded in her new life. Good! If this is to be what he leaves 
behind—this daughter, this woman—then he does not have to 
be ashamed. (62; my emphasis)
Lurie’s pastoral epistemology leads him to fi gure (erroneously) Lucy’s 
relation to the land as one of entrenching herself in the land. His minimal 
image of Lucy’s toes gripping the earth gently hints at the clinging rela-
tion to the land implied in the pastoral discourse he uses. As we shall see, 
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Lucy herself does not conceive a relation in terms of territorial depth. 
The trope of territorial depth is amplifi ed in Ettinger whom Lurie fi g-
ures as a character organically bonded with the earth. Within Lurie’s in-
formal pastoral echelon, Ettinger’s “true organicism” is set against Lucy’s 
“false pastoralism”:
Petrus will not be contented to plough forever his hectare and a 
half. Lucy is still chickenfeed: an amateur, an enthusiast of the 
farming life rather than a farmer. Petrus would like to take over 
Lucy’s land. Then he would like to have Ettinger’s too, or enough 
of it to run a herd on. Ettinger will be a harder nut to crack. Lucy 
is merely a transient; Ettinger is another peasant, a man of the 
earth, tenacious, eingewurzelt [i.e., rooted in]. (117)15
Lurie’s narrative is typically unreliable here and irony at a few levels is 
present in this passage. While Lurie ranks Lucy below Ettinger, the re-
verse is actually true: it is not Lucy who is the transient but Ettinger. As 
Lucy clear-sightedly observes, it is “just a matter of time before Ettinger 
is found with a bullet in his back” (204). Conversely, as I argue in the 
next section, it is Lucy who exhibits a tenacious persistence in the land 
though in a mode distinct from Ettinger’s tenacious entrenchment. 
The passage further ironizes the pastoral cliché of Ettinger as a “man 
of the earth” by suggesting that this organic trope fi nds its corollary in 
Ettinger’s tenacious clinging to the land, a gesture underscored by the 
trope of territorial depth (“eingewurzelt”). In this ironic reading, what 
lies beneath the transcendent rhetoric of Ettinger’s organic bond with 
the land is but the impulse to cling tenaciously to the land. Further, 
tropes of territorial depth in pastoral, like the motif of being “rooted 
in” the land, become precisely a measure of one’s unyielding hold of the 
land. Earlier on, Lurie imagines how Ettinger, “man of the earth,” in 
practice remains tenaciously rooted in his land parcel: 
… Ettinger telephones, offering to lend them a gun ‘for the 
meanwhile.’ ‘Thank you,’ he replies. ‘We’ll think about it.’
 He gets out Lucy’s tools and repairs the kitchen door as well 
as he is able. They ought to install bars, security gates, a perim-
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eter fence, as Ettinger has done. They ought to turn the farm-
house into a fortress. Lucy ought to buy a pistol and a two-way 
radio, and take shooting lessons. But will she ever consent? She 
is here because she loves the land and the old, ländliche way of 
life. If that way of life is doomed, what is left for her to love? 
(113)
There is a gesture toward unmasking the organic rhetoric of Ettinger’s 
“natural” bond with the earth to reveal that the true basis of Ettinger’s 
deep bond with the land is the use of material force now so clearly dis-
played. It is perhaps also signifi cant that this depiction of the material 
basis by which Ettinger holds on to the land is juxtaposed to the pas-
toral rhetoric of loving the land which, I have argued, is vacuous. The 
juxtaposition invites consideration that the rhetoric of loving the land, 
which proves hollow, and the ferocious clinging to it by all means are 
corollaries. Though we experience a vacillation in the passage from the 
tough rhetoric of Ettinger’s militarized response to the soft rhetoric of 
love Lurie (misguidedly) attributes to Lucy, they are but two sides of 
the same impulse to cling to the land. This skeptical reading of love as a 
possessive, clinging impulse is echoed by the parallel in Boyhood (122–3) 
and Youth (98–100) of maternal love as an imprisoning force that clings 
to the child.
The novel is critical of pastoral’s duplicitous rhetoric of territori-
al depth, organicism, love and transcendence. The intensity of South 
African pastoral’s transcendent rhetoric, Coetzee slyly implies, is pre-
cisely the measure of its ferocious unyielding grasp of the land. Disgrace 
further doubles pastoral’s motif of tenacious clinging by suggesting how 
deeply this white discourse entrenches itself in the psyche. In the novel, 
the mental sphere is fi gured in terms of land imagery to underscore that 
relation to the land is determined not only by material structures but by 
mental rhetorical structures like, as discussed, white pastoral discourse. 
Lecturing on the operation of the Romantic imagination in The Prelude, 
Lurie refers to “the sense-image, kept as fl eeting as possible, as a means 
toward stirring or activating the idea that lies buried more deeply in the 
soil of memory”(22; my emphasis). The trope of territorial depth is again 
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evoked though in a non-literal sense to suggest how an idea or “a great 
[archetype] of the mind” (22) can be deeply rooted in consciousness. At 
a later point, Lurie self-knowingly refl ects on how prejudices settle and 
stagnate in his mind: 
He does not like women who make no effort to be attractive. 
It is a resistance he has had to Lucy’s friends before. Nothing 
to be proud of: a prejudice that has settled in his mind, settled 
down. His mind has become a refuge of old thoughts, idle, indi-
gent, with nowhere to go. He ought to chase them out, sweep the 
premises clean. But he does not care to do so, or does not care 
enough. (72; my emphasis)
Though the subject here is unattractive women, the term “settled” 
playfully suggests how settler rhetoric itself can become settled in the 
mind, taking the form of old and idle prejudices entrenching themselves 
“indigenously” in the mind. The rhetoric of the Afrikaner’s deep-rooted-
ness in the soil of Africa is doubled in the suggestion of its deep-rooted-
ness in the soil of the mind. Pastoral discourse, one could say, clings te-
naciously not just to the land, but to the mind. Even as the novel traces 
a deeper foundation to this white foundational discourse, it attempts to 
eliminate this foundational discourse by inviting one to read a character, 
Lucy, whose mental slate is wiped clean of pastoral, in its effort to re-
imagine the foundations of one’s relation to South Africa as homeland. 
Lucy’s decolonized consciousness contrasts with Lurie’s whose irony to-
wards pastoral is inadequate in eradicating its deep-rooted persistence 
in his mind.
Lucy and Foundations: Tenaciously “Rooted in” South Africa
Through Lucy, the novel attempts to negate and rewrite white founda-
tional discourse. I have suggested how in Lucy’s mind pastoral discourse 
is eliminated. Lucy is thus free from conceiving her relation to South 
Africa in terms of pastoral’s duplicitous and self-serving codes. Further, 
through Lucy, the novel re-writes the pastoral trope of being “rooted 
in” South Africa. Below I argue that Lucy is as tenaciously “rooted in” 
in South Africa as is Ettinger though in a manner distinct from the lat-
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ter’s pastoral mode. Lucy’s tenacious persistence in South Africa is not 
to be questioned though it is conceived not in terms of pastoral tran-
scendence as Lurie imagines (217) but in terms of Beckettian poetics. 
Further, though Lucy may be “rooted in” in South Africa, her gesture is 
not conceived in terms of land or territorial depth. Through Lucy, the 
novel presents an alternative way of conceiving white foundations in 
South Africa. 
Lucy’s tenacious rootedness in South Africa is suggested by Coetzee’s 
coding of her in Beckett’s non-totalizing trope of repetition and infi n-
ity, present in the latter’s novel trilogy, Molloy, Malone Dies and The 
Unnamable.16 In the aftermath of the rape, when Lucy tells Lurie her 
intention is “to go on as before” (105), she echoes the famous last words 
of Beckett’s unnamable at the close of the trilogy: “… where I am, I don’t 
know, I’ll never know, in the silence you don’t know, you must go on, I 
can’t go on, I’ll go on” (414). The immediate parallel suggested is between 
Lucy and the persistence and inextinguishability of the unnamable who 
is dead, can’t go on yet still goes on. Lucy’s Beckettian response consti-
tutes a mode of rootedness in South Africa distinct from how rootedness 
is envisioned by South African pastoral. Lucy’s process of rooting herself 
in South Africa is, within the Beckettian mold, continually coming to 
a halt, a point of exhaustion, a point of death, though it is driven by a 
larger imperative and will to restart and go on. The Beckettian dialectic 
of negation and persistence is implied in Lucy’s letter to Lurie which, 
echoing the unnamable, is her “last word” (161) to him. Her letter also 
reiterates her frustration of being misread by her father: 
Half an hour later an envelope is pushed under his door. ‘Dear 
David, You have not been listening to me. I am not the person 
you know. I am a dead person and I do not know yet what will 
bring me back to life. All I know is that I cannot go away.
 ‘You do not see this, and I do not know what more I can 
do to make you see. It is as if you have chosen deliberately to 
sit in a corner where the rays of the sun do not shine. I think 
of you as one of the three chimpanzees, the one with his paws 
over his eyes.
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 ‘Yes, the road I am following may be the wrong one. But if I 
leave the farm now I will leave defeated, and will taste that 
defeat for the rest of my life.’ (161; my emphasis)
Beckettian poetics is echoed in Lucy’s posture of death and uncertain-
ty, with the only minimal certainty being the fact that “[she] cannot go 
away.” It is in terms of these confl icting Beckettian topoi of radical nega-
tion and inextinguishability that Lucy will persist, go on, be tenaciously 
rooted in South Africa. In the novel’s fi nal vision of Lucy, Lurie is right 
to imagine Lucy’s persistence in perpetuity (217) though the irony is 
that Lucy will not persist in terms of pastoral immortality as Lurie imag-
ines but in terms of Beckettian inexhaustibility. Put schematically, one 
encounters a playful juxtaposition of traditional and poststructuralist 
conceptions of infi nity and, more specifi cally, the recasting of Romantic 
organic transcendence into Beckett’s non-totalizing infi nity. Through 
Lucy, white foundational discourse is rewritten so that it has its basis not 
in pastoral transcendence but in Beckettian poetics.
It is crucial to read Lucy accurately as Lucy, in particular her episte-
mology, is key to the novel’s rewriting of white foundations. A careful 
reading of Lucy will reveal an epistemology that is free from transcen-
dent modes of thought and that instead operates in minimal and non-
absolutist modes, which are indicative of Lucy’s paradoxical stance of 
conceiving her South African foundations in non-foundational ways. 
The reader, however, may fi nd it diffi cult to make out Lucy’s perspec-
tive given that her speech is often spare or punctuated by silence17 and, 
more importantly, that she is accessible only through Lurie’s mediation 
and misinterpretation. In order to read Lucy adequately, one needs to 
make a conscious effort to re-imagine the novel against the grain of its 
lopsided bias, with Lucy as a character in her own right as opposed to 
her subordinate status in the current text. Such an act would heed the 
novel’s metafi ctional cue that “people are not divided into major and 
minor” and that all persons are subjects in their own right (198). The 
task is to imagine the story of Disgrace re-told in Lucy’s perspective, free 
from its subordination within Lurie’s unreliable epistemology. Despite 
Lurie dominating the present lopsided text, I argue that the text con-
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tains suffi cient material on Lucy for one to reconstruct an adequate view 
of Lucy’s epistemology in its own right. 
The practice of reading against Lurie’s dominant voice to arrive at 
a more accurate understanding of Lucy’s epistemology can be applied 
for instance in our reading of Lucy’s tendency toward silence. Here it is 
crucial to read against Lurie’s (incorrect) assumption that Lucy’s silences 
conceal her disgrace (115, 109). Earlier, I suggested that the Odyssean 
parallel cues the reader on seeing the fi gures in Disgrace as characterized 
by Homeric epithets. Viewed in the mold of Penelope, Lucy is “cir-
cumspect.”18 Indeed, an important structural contrast in the novel is 
the discrepancy between Lucy’s circumspection and Lurie’s recklessness 
in thought and speech (208), with the implication that while Lurie’s 
epistemology is radically unreliable, Lucy’s epistemology in relation to 
the “new South Africa” is the more wary, clear-sighted and reliable. As 
suggested, Lurie’s recklessness results in gross misreadings of Lucy and 
Petrus, and the tendency to speak on behalf of other characters. In con-
trast, Lucy’s silences are part of her circumspect epistemology that care-
fully mulls over the various possibilities within her present position in 
the “new South Africa.” Thus, “circumspect” Lucy at one point tells 
Lurie, “There is nothing you can suggest that I haven’t been through a 
hundred times myself ” (157). Lucy’s brooding silences in the narrative 
refl ect not her shame but her circumspect mentality in active process. 
Even as Lucy demonstrates that she is tenaciously rooted in, deter-
mined to conceive her foundations in South Africa, she displays an epis-
temology characterized by non-absolutist and minimal modes. She stays 
on not in a posture of ironclad certainty and transcendence, but one 
simultaneously characterized by doubt (Beckettian) and circumspec-
tion (Penelopean). Such a stance eschews foundational, totalizing pro-
nouncements and restricts itself to modest, limited observations. Lucy’s 
stance is further minimal in her eschewing of actions based on abstrac-
tions (112) which confi nes her acts to being motivated by a restricted 
epistemology of immediate empirical reality. Decolonized of totalizing 
abstractions, Lucy acts only in terms of the immediate concrete reality, 
a modality that also subjects her to the non-absolutist nature of empiri-
cal reality that she accepts. Thus, Lucy’s acceptance of Petrus’ “marriage 
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offer” is based on an assessment of Petrus and her circumstances that is 
as notable for its circumspection as it is limited to a concrete, non-ab-
solutist reality:
‘No. Wait. Before you get on your high horse with Petrus, take 
a moment to consider my situation objectively. Objectively I 
am a woman alone. I have no brothers. I have a father, but he is 
far away and anyhow powerless in the terms that matter here. 
To whom can I turn for protection, for patronage? To Ettinger? 
It is just a matter of time before Ettinger is found with a bullet 
in his back. Practically speaking, there is only Petrus left. Petrus 
may not be a big man but he is big enough for someone small 
like me. And at least I know Petrus. I have no illusions about 
him. I know what I would be letting myself in for.’ (204)
Even as Lucy is rooted to South Africa, she establishes her relation to 
South Africa in modest modes. It is not given to totalizing abstractions 
but confi ned to immediate empirical reality. It relinquishes absolutist 
formulations to be content with relative formulations. It is also limited 
by its posture of circumspection. Yet, precisely because Lucy’s relation to 
South Africa is modestly limited, it is in its minimal way clear-sighted of 
the country’s realities. In Bev’s quiet praise of how “[Lucy] lives closer to 
the ground than [either herself or Lurie]” (210), the reader fi nds a sug-
gestion of Lucy’s commendably clear-sighted epistemology—one that 
is more reliably proximate to the country’s realities. The novel in fact 
enacts a refi guring of territorial tropes so that while Lucy is not “rooted 
in” the land, she is clear-sightedly “[close] to the ground.” Though Lucy 
does not clutch the land, she is still intimate with it. 
The impulse in the postapartheid period to rethink the white South 
African’s relation to South Africa by rewriting the rhetorical relation to 
the land is, Coetzee discerns, also present in the work of his contempo-
rary, the Afrikaner novelist Breyten Breytenbach. In Coetzee’s review of 
Breytenbach’s Return to Paradise (1993), he observes:
The plague that Breytenbach pronounces on all parties … 
makes up the less interesting half of the book. Its best pages ad-
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dress a more intimate and a more fundamental concern: what 
it means to him to be rooted in a landscape, to be African born. 
(Stranger Shores 306)
As I have argued, the issue of “what it means … to be rooted in a land-
scape” is an equally vital concern for Lucy and for Disgrace as a whole. 
Coetzee views Breytenbach’s subsequent work Dog Heart, published in the 
same year as Disgrace, as articulating an ethics of relation to the land: “The 
land, says Breytenbach [in Dog Heart], belongs to no one, and the correct 
relation to the land is the nomad’s: live on it, live off it, move on; fi nd ways 
of loving it without becoming bound to it” (Stranger Shores 313). In its own 
way, through its critique of pastoral and rewriting of white foundations, 
Disgrace too is in quest of articulating a “correct relation to the land.”
Ultimately, however, in its effort to rewrite white foundations, Disgrace 
would effect a shift in the conception of homeland away from land to-
wards people. Though Lucy is “rooted in” South Africa, the novel elimi-
nates the territorial connotations of the trope: Lucy relinquishes her 
land and stays on not by way of land ownership. Coetzee has observed 
that the emphasis on land in white South African literature and art ac-
tually masks a failure to engage with South Africa’s indigenous people. 
In White Writing, he speculates that the prominence of the “empty land-
scape” topos in South African (though Eurocentric) landscape poetry 
and art belies a failure to conceive of South Africa as a “peopled land-
scape.” He observes: 
… the continued apprehension of silence (by the poet) or 
blankness (by the painter), stands for, or stands in the place of, 
another failure, by no means inevitable: a failure to imagine a 
peopled landscape, an inability to conceive a society in South 
Africa in which there is a place for the self. (9)
Such a dynamic, where the white emphasis on land masks a ne-
glect of people, is expounded as a theme in Coetzee’s “Jerusalem Prize 
Acceptance Speech”:
To be blunt: their love is not enough today and has not been 
enough since they arrived on the continent; furthermore, their 
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talk, their excessive talk, about how they love South Africa has 
consistently been directed toward the land, that is, toward what 
is least likely to respond to love: mountains and deserts, birds 
and animals and fl owers.
 If one fails to see the relevance of this talk about love, one 
can replace the word love with the word fraternity. The veiled 
unfreedom of the white man in South Africa has always made 
itself felt most keenly when, stepping down for a moment 
from his lonely throne, giving in to a wholly human and un-
derstandable yearning for fraternity with the people among 
whom he lives, he has discovered with a shock that fraternity 
by itself is not to be had, no matter how compellingly felt the 
impulse on both sides. Fraternity ineluctably comes in a pack-
age with liberty and equality. The vain and essentially senti-
mental yearning that expresses itself in the reform movement 
in South Africa today is a yearning to have fraternity without 
paying for it.
 What is the price that has to be paid? The very lowest price is 
the destruction of the unnatural structures of power that defi ne 
the South African state. (Doubling 97; original emphasis)
Though Coetzee is referring to the apartheid era, the pathway he out-
lines of a shift from relationship with land to one with people, along 
with the price to be paid for such a shift, is still relevant for Disgrace. In 
Lucy, the novel imagines a relation with South Africa that is primarily 
in terms of people and not land. Lucy roots herself in South Africa in a 
manner that involves not land but long-term, non-fl y-by-night relations 
with people. Further, Disgrace refl ects the awareness that relations with 
people involve a price, in particular, the outstanding debt white South 
Africans owe black South Africans. In the course of the novel, Lucy ne-
gotiates the price to be paid by her as she establishes roots with people. 
Lucy’s orientation towards people is demonstrated by her capacity 
for empathy (which accompanies her circumspection) and by her non-
evasive countenancing of the likely (though by no means determinate) 
price she has to pay for staying on in South Africa:
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She broods a long while before she answers. ‘But isn’t there an-
other way of looking at it, David? What if … what if that is the 
price one has to pay for staying on? Perhaps that is how they look 
at it; perhaps that is how I should look at it. They see me as owing 
something. They see themselves as debt collectors, tax collectors. 
Why should I be allowed to live here without paying? Perhaps 
that is what they tell themselves. (158; original emphasis)
The course of the narrative sees Lucy working out the price she has to 
pay for staying on, a process refl ected by the narrative’s play with deic-
tic expressions (“that is the price”). By the fi nal stages of the novel, the 
price—again indicated by “that”—has shifted as Lucy enters into a deal 
with Petrus in which she yields her land to him in exchange for his pro-
tection: “Yes, I agree, it is humiliating. But perhaps that is a good point 
to start from again. Perhaps that is what I must learn to accept. To start 
at ground level” (205). Faced with the price exacted by anonymous as-
sailants-at-large and, separately, with the price exacted by Petrus with 
whom she is familiar and in an offer that has advantages to herself and 
her child, Lucy chooses to accept Petrus’ offer and in effect pays a lower 
price. The recurrence of deictic expressions involving “that” indicates 
shifting contexts and the continual working out of the price to be paid 
for Lucy to become part of the South African community. Petrus’ offer, 
though not entirely altruistic, is primarily a goodwill gesture that eases 
the price obligation on Lucy even as it refl ects Petrus’ shrewd initiative 
in devising a plan of long-term protection for Lucy. Contrary to Lurie’s 
reading of Petrus as threatening (202–3), Petrus’ stance towards Lucy is 
generally one of help and goodwill, refl ected for instance in Bev’s remark 
on how “Petrus slaved to get the market going for Lucy” who thus “owes 
[Petrus] a lot” (140). Lucy does starkly countenance the possible price 
she might have to pay for staying on. Nevertheless, as a result of Petrus’ 
good-intentioned (and shrewd) intervention, she pays a smaller price for 
which she also gains long lasting roots in Petrus’ community. 
In its play with deictic expressions, the novel may be alluding to 
Bishop Tutu’s justifi cation of the TRC’s amnesty provision as recounted 
in Antjie Krog’s Country of My Skull:
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Suddenly people seem to fi nd the idea of amnesty repugnant. 
And Tutu is the one to explain: “We did not decide on amnesty. 
The political parties decided on amnesty. The amnesty clause 
was inserted in the early hours of the morning after an exhaust-
ed night of negotiating. The last thing, the last sentence, the 
last clause, was added: amnesty shall be granted through a pro-
cess of reconciliation. And it was only after that was put in, that 
the boere signed the negotiations, opening the door to our elec-
tion.” Tutu repeats this story in all the languages he can muster. 
(30–1; original emphasis) 
In the TRC Report, Tutu agrees: “Amnesty is a heavy price to pay. It 
is, however, the price the negotiators believed our country would have 
to pay to avoid ‘an alternative too ghastly to contemplate’” (12). In the 
national scenario of deal-making, the “that” turns out to be the am-
nesty provision for offenders in a conception of the price for the deal as 
one borne by apartheid victims. Disgrace suggests how the deal of the 
Constitution does not work and fi gures the “that” as a price that con-
tinues to be worked out and one primarily to be borne by whites and 
not by blacks. Lucy’s transaction with Petrus is termed a “deal,” an “alli-
ance” (203), a “negotiation” (205), invoking language that deliberately 
mirrors the process of the Constitution. The novel suggests that, beyond 
the ineffective national deal of the Constitution, deal-making continues 
“[close] to the ground” as individuals continue to negotiate the price for 
the foundation of the “new South Africa.”
Notes
 1 Petrus is characterized as one who has a distinct command of and affi nity for 
the English language. We are told that when Petrus speaks, he “[savours] the 
phrase” (64), “brings out the words with a fl ourish, showing off his mastery” 
(136) and “pronounces the words as if he has never heard them before, as if they 
have popped up before him like a rabbit out of a hat” (152). He is also capable 
of sly puns (“A woman must be marry.” [202]) and, equally, has the sly “habit 
of letting words hang in the air” (152). Lurie’s view that English is “an unfi t me-
dium” for Petrus’ story (117) is in fact a patronizing underestimation of Petrus’ 
resourcefulness and cunning with the language which, I argue, is a sign of his 
alignment with Odyssean polymetis. 
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 2 There are structural parallels within the twenty-four-chapter division of the two 
texts. For example, Odysseus’ triumphant reclamation of his great hall in Book 
22 of the Odyssey is paralleled by events in Chapter 22 of Disgrace in which 
Petrus too clinches his “victory.” Petrus’ proposal of “marriage” to Lucy is ac-
cepted and Lucy cedes her land to him. While the chapter contains no physical 
violence, Lurie aptly thinks of Petrus’ marital proposal—his coup de grace—in 
martial terms: “So … that is what all the shadow-boxing was for: this bid, this 
blow!” (202).
 3 “So he is home again. It does not feel like a homecoming” (175). Lurie’s home-
coming is deliberately anti-heroic—he fi nds himself in a situation of obsoles-
cence and dispossession as opposed to one of victorious restoration: “The end 
of roaming. What comes after the end of roaming? … The life of a superannu-
ated scholar, without hope, without prospect …” (175). He discovers his house 
burgled and his possessions usurped: “He wanders through the house taking a 
census of his losses.… Who is at this moment wearing his shoes?” (176). 
 4 For example, in recalling his encounter with Melanie, Lurie thinks: “I was a ser-
vant of Eros: that is what he wants to say, but does he have the effrontery? It was 
a god who acted through me. What vanity! Yet, not a lie, not entirely” (89; original 
emphasis).
 5 In addition to being a condensation of Book 22 of the Odyssey as I explain below, 
this passage is also a bricolage of textual fragments from Robert Fagles’ transla-
tion of the Odyssey. It incorporates fragments from (a) Athena’s prophetic fore-
knowledge of the suitors’ doom: “I have a feeling some will splatter your ample 
fl oors/with all their blood and brains” (13.452–3); (b) from the description of 
“[the suitors leaping] from their seats, milling about, desperate, scanning the 
stone walls …” (22.23–4) after Odysseus’ fi rst arrow brings down Antinous; (c) 
from the description of Odysseus’ decimation of the suitors trapped in the hall:
 … he, as long as he’d arrows left to defend himself,
 kept picking suitors off in the palace, one by one
 and down they went, corpse on corpse in droves. (22.124–6; my emphasis)
 6 Book 22 ends with the execution of the unfaithful maids where Telemachus 
makes it clear that they will not die swift, merciful deaths: “No clean death for 
the likes of them, by god!” (488). Coetzee alludes to this ethic in the tall man’s 
failure to administer a coup de grâce to the dying dog.
 7 The tall man and his accomplices use a lie to get into Lucy’s house. Their ruse 
alludes to Odysseus’ encounter with Cyclops in its use of “nobody” (“Is no one 
there.” [93]). 
 8 According to the TRC Report, ubuntu refers to a traditional African value that 
generally translates as “humaneness.” “Its spirit emphasizes respect for human 
dignity, marking a shift from confrontation to conciliation” (127). For a dis-
cussion of the strategic use of ubuntu in the reconciliation process, see Wilson 
(9–13).
36
Gi lb e r t  Yeoh
 9 In another example, the underworld seer Tiresias assures Odysseus: “No doubt 
you will pay them back in blood when you come home!” (11.135).
 10 The killing of individual suitors, their collaborators and the disloyal maids 
are equally notable for their indulgence in gory violence. Take, for example, 
Melanthius’ death: “They hauled him out through the doorway, into the court,/
lopped his nose and ears with a ruthless knife,/ tore his genitals out for the dogs 
to eat raw/and in manic fury hacked off hands and feet” (22.501–4).
 11 Wilson concludes: “One of the main results of my ethnographic inquiries was 
the centrality of emotions of vengeance in popular legal consciousness and 
practices of revenge in local justice institutions. Despite the existence of many 
rarefi ed national institutions dedicated to protecting human rights (not only 
the TRC, but also the Gender Commission, the Constitutional Court and the 
Human Rights Commission) enclaves of revenge controlled by militarized youth 
and punitive elders continued to shape the character of justice in the townships 
of South Africa. Because it was guided by a religious-redemptive notion of rec-
onciliation, the TRC was never able to engage with, much less transform, these 
emotions and structures” (xx).
 12 Within the narrative context of Lurie as the focal character, the subtext alludes 
to the occlusion of black anger from his mental sphere, underlining a white 
character’s inability to imagine the scale of anger he is faced with for the offences 
of his race. Lurie’s blindness and folly are mirrored by the suitors’ ignorance: 
“Poor fools blind to the fact/that all their necks were in the noose, their dooms 
sealed.”
 13 This failure stems from the failure to observe that Lucy’s consciousness is distinct 
from Lurie’s.
 14 I discuss Mrs Curren’s extensive unreliable narration in Age of Iron in “Love and 
Indifference in J. M. Coetzee’s Age of Iron.”
 15 Lurie’s assessment of Lucy in terms of a “false pastoralism” may strike one as 
contradicting his earlier view of Lucy as “no longer a child playing at farming but 
a solid countrywoman.” Contradiction and inconsistency are features of Lurie’s 
unreliable narration and should be read precisely as such.
 16 For accounts of this structure, see the poststructuralist readings of Beckettian 
repetition in Connor and Hill (59–78).
 17 Lucy’s silences are an important feature of her characterization. Silence punctu-
ates her dialogues with Lurie. For example: “There is a long silence” (155). “She 
is silent” (157). “She broods a long while before she answers” (158). “There is a 
pause between them” (205). “There is a long silence between them” (216). 
 18 Lucy’s association with Penelope is also suggested by the wild geese on her small-
holding which echo the portent of Penelope’s geese (19.602–24). Coetzee too 
gives a (playful) symbolic dimension to Lucy’s geese (88).
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